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ABSTRACT
The market for Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) devices is booming
and, at the same time, has become an attractive target for adver-
saries. To improve BLE security at large, we present BTLEmap, an
auditing application for BLE environments. BTLEmap is inspired
by network discovery and security auditing tools such as Nmap for
IP-based networks. It allows for device enumeration, Generic At-
tribute Profile (GATT) service discovery, and device fingerprinting.
It also features a BLE advertisement dissector, data exporter, and a
user-friendly UI including a proximity view. BTLEmap currently
runs on iOS and macOS using Apple’s CoreBluetooth API but also
accepts alternative data inputs such as a Raspberry Pi to overcome
the restricted vendor API. The open-source project is under active
development and will provide more advanced capabilities such as
long-term device tracking (in spite of MAC address randomization)
in the future.
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• Security and privacy→ Mobile and wireless security; Soft-
ware reverse engineering; • Software and its engineering →
Software creation and management.
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1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Since the introduction of Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) in 2010 [1],
the technology has become widely adopted in smartphones, wear-
ables, and other IoT devices. In a modern household, there can be
more than a dozen devices that supporting this technology. They
are constantly sending BLE advertisements to inform devices in
their surrounding about their presence but typically without the
owner noticing. Most recently, BLE has been proposed to be used
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Figure 1: BTLEmap’s proximity view
for contact tracing during the COVID-19 pandemic. Most of the
tracing solutions use BLE advertisements containing a custom iden-
tification token that can be linked to an infected person.
BLE advertisements pose a vast surface for privacy-compro-
mising attacks. In the past, several researchers found that BLE
advertisements may contain fixed identifiers that allow for device
tracking despite MAC address randomization [6] and could contain
personally identifiable information about the user such as their
phone number or email address [9]. Besides, an adversary might
place a tracking device based on BLE, such as the rumored Apple
AirTags [4], in a person’s pocket and leverage a crowd-sourced
finder network to track their target. In essence, BLE devices share
potentially sensitive data with devices in proximity. To improve
our understanding of the (privacy-related) attack surface at large,
e. g., by analyzing privacy leaks or detecting malicious devices, we
as a security community require better application support.
We propose BTLEmap (pronounce as beetle map), a network dis-
covery and security auditing tool in the spirit of Nmap [5] but for
BLE environments. Currently, BTLEmap supports device enumera-
tion, advertisement dissection, rudimentary device fingerprinting, a
proximity view, and more. With its extensible and modular design,
it will support more advanced features such as long-term device
tracking and comprehensive fingerprinting capabilities in the future.
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Figure 2: BTLEmap’s software architecture
We make BTLEmap for iOS and macOS available as open-source
software on GitHub and distribute the application bundle for iOS
and macOS via Apple’s official App Store for free.
2 BTLEMAP
Our initial version of BTLEmap runs on iOS and macOS using
SwiftUI and macOS Catalyst to enable rich animations combined
with a unified user experience across multiple platforms. Our tool
should be the first approach to analyze surroundings for BLE de-
vices and for researchers who want to discover new targets that
should be analyzed. It automatically scans the environment for BLE
devices, lists their advertisements, connects to them to detect the
supported services. All received advertisements are stored for long
term analysis and can be exported.
Our design favors modularity, as shown in Fig. 2. At its core,
BTLEmap uses a data store for recording advertisements. It supports
both internal and external input sources (more in Section 2.4) and
an extensible dissector module that already implements multiple
dissectors for Apple’s BLE advertisements. Finally, different views,
such as a proximity view (Section 2.1), present the advertisement
data in different ways. In the following, we highlight some of BTLE-
map’s features, in particular, the proximity view, the advertisement
dissector, the automated device detection, and support for external
scanning sources. Also, we discuss areas for future work.
2.1 Proximity view
Using the central data store, BTLEmap can create different repre-
sentations of the BLE readings. Figure 1 shows a proximity view
that estimates the distance to devices by using the Received signal
strength indication (RSSI) values in combinationwith the advertised
transmission power of each advertisement that has been received.
The scanner can be used to discover devices in proximity quickly
and to estimate how far away devices are. Even though RSSI values
cannot be used to measure an exact distance, it is possible to esti-
mate a relative distance between the devices shown on the circular
plane. At the moment, the angles shown are random because the
current chips and APIs do not allow to measure the angle-of-arrival
(AoA). As this feature is part of the current Bluetooth Core Specifi-
cation [2, 1.A.8], we plan to implement it as soon as AoA becomes
available to the public.
2.2 Advertisement dissector
BLE advertisements contain up to 31 bytes of information about
the emitting device or its services. Existing BLE scanners such as
Nordic’s nRF Connect [7] display this information as a simple byte
string as there is no standard on what information can be encoded
or how it is encoded. BTLEmap leverages the reverse engineering
efforts of several researcher teams [3, 6, 9] to present the user with
additional information about the state of the device. For example,
Apple AirPods indicate the model name, colors, and battery status.
We depict our Wireshark-inspired dissector view in Fig. 4.
2.3 Automated device detection
Apart from analyzing BLE advertising packets, BTLEmap has the
option to automatically connect to all devices in range, query the
supported services, and read the values of characteristics. This
results in automated device detection, listing the manufacturer,
device type, device names, and more. Many users tend to rename
their Bluetooth enabled speakers or headphones, which can result
in a privacy leak and tracking possibilities because BLE often allows
unauthenticated connections. BTLEmap can be used to make such
issues visible for researchers and for non-scientific users.
2.4 External scanning sources
The iOS and macOS APIs for BLE scanning are limited. We have
found that the CoreBluetooth API on iOS does not report any man-
ufacturer data that starts using Apple’s company identifier 0x4c00
(little-endian). On macOS, the manufacturer data is not stripped,
but the API will not retrieve all Generic Attribute Profile (GATT)
services supported by a device. The frameworks strip away Apple-
specific services that should not be accessible from other devices.
Furthermore, it is not possible to retrieve a device’s (randomized)
BLE MAC address, because bluetoothd replaces all MAC addresses
with an on-demand generated UUID.
These inherent restrictions would limit the usefulness of BTLE-
map. Therefore, we support external Bluetooth scanner inputs such
as a Raspberry Pi (3 or newer/Zero W). The external device im-
plements a simple Bluetooth scanner and forwards all received
advertisements and discovered services in real-time to a connected
macOS or iOS device. The Raspberry Pi connects over a direct Eth-
ernet connection or by using Ethernet-over-USB to receive power
and set up a connection, as shown in Fig. 3. BTLEmap announces
itself as services via multicast DNS such that the Raspberry Pi can
automatically connect to it. The modular setup allows to support
most functionality on the device running the app, but increase the
feature spectrum by adding additional hardware.
2.5 Additional features
BTLEmap currently supports several additional features: (1) An
RSSI graph displaying all devices and the received RSSI values at
a specific time. (2) An RSSI recorder that allows recording RSSI
readings and exporting them to CSV files later. (3) Several filters,
such as manufacturer or RSSI. (4) Highlighting the recently active
devices. (5) Import and export of pcap files.
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Figure 3: BTLEmap setup with an external scanner source
Figure 4: Decoding of an BLE advertisement emitted by Ap-
ple AirPods earphones
2.6 Future work
At the moment, we are fine-tuning our implementation to be ready
for a public release. Additionally, we work on algorithms that allow
further automatic analysis of BLE advertisements by identifying
“trackable” identifiers, thus, revealing potentially private data.
We started with macOS and iOS, because it allows us to com-
bine BLE with Apple’s custom protocol Apple Wireless Direct Link
(AWDL) [8]. Apple devices always send out BLE advertisements
before they setup a peer-to-peer connection over AWDL, e. g., for ex-
changing files. In the future we want to visualize those connections
over AWDL by monitoring both interfaces in parallel.
If Bluetooth chips adopt AoA support and it becomes available
through public APIs, BTLEmap could leverage the AoA of wireless
signals to align devices in the proximity view in Section 2.1 with
actual angles. Finally, as our core framework is written in Swift,
portability to other platforms such as Linux is possible with some
caveats.
3 DEMONSTRATION SETUP
Our demonstration provides every participant with an application
binary running on macOS and gives them the ability to join a
TestFlight Beta for an iOS build. We provide an introduction to
BTLEmap and present the available features during a live session
or via a pre-recorded video. The demonstration starts with the
general scanning and dissection features: we use Apple AirPods
advertisements to detect the device model and the state, as shown
in Fig. 4. We also demonstrate Apple AirDrop advertisements. We
continue the demonstration by showing the distance estimations
when devices are moving around the scanning device. Then we
use the scanning device to find hidden BLE devices. Finally, we
show how to enumerate devices in combination with a Raspberry
Pi as an external scanning source. Participants can test the software
immediately and report any recommendations for future releases
on GitHub.
AVAILABILITY
BTLEmap is available open-source on https://github.com/seemoo-
lab/BTLEmap. All necessary frameworks are also published on our
GitHub account. Furthermore, the app will be made available on
TestFlight as soon as possible. After our Beta test, we will distribute
BTLEmap via the official Apple App Store for free. It allows other
researchers without a development background to get easy access
to our tool and it includes non-scientific users that are curious
about their BLE environment.
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